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I. INTRODUCTION
TATES' and nations' laws collide when foreign factors appear in a
lawsuit. Non-resident litigants, incidents outside the forum, parallel
lawsuits, and judgments from other jurisdictions can create
problems with personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition of
foreign judgments. This Article reviews Texas conflict cases from state
and federal courts in Texas during the Survey period from November 1,
2010 through October 31, 2011. The Article excludes cases involving (1)
federal-state conflicts; (2) intrastate issues, such as subject matter juris-
diction and venue; and (3) conflicts in time, such as the applicability of
prior or subsequent law within a state. State and federal cases are dis-
cussed together because conflict of laws is mostly a state-law topic, except
for a few constitutional limits, resulting in the same rules applying to most
issues in state and federal courts.'
Although no data is readily available to confirm this, Texas is certainly
a primary state in the production of conflict-of-laws precedents. This re-
sults not only from its size and population, but also from its placement
bordering four states, as well as a civil-law nation, and its involvement in
international shipping. Only California shares these factors, with the par-
tial exception of the states bordering Quebec. Texas courts experience
every range of conflict-of-laws litigation. In addition to a large number of
opinions on the garden-variety examples of personal jurisdiction, Texas
courts produce case law every year on Internet-based jurisdiction, proro-
gating and derogating forum-selection clauses, federal long-arm statutes
with nationwide process, international forum non conveniens, parallel lit-
igation, international family-law issues, and private lawsuits against for-
eign sovereigns. Interstate and international judgment recognition and
enforcement offer fewer annual examples-the lack of reported cases on
this subject is likely a function of its administrative nature.
Texas state and federal courts provide a fascinating study of conflicts
issues every year, but the volume of case law now greatly exceeds this
Survey's ability to report on them, a function both of journal space and
the authors' time. Accordingly, this Survey's article focuses on selective
cases.
II. FORUM CONTESTS
Asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires amenabil-
ity to Texas jurisdiction and receipt of proper notice. Amenability may
be established by consent (usually based on a contract's forum-selection
clause), waiver (failing to make a timely objection), or extraterritorial
service of process under a Texas long-arm statute. Because most aspects
1. See RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS 649-95 (4th
ed. 2001) (for a thorough discussion of the role of federal law in choice-of-law questions).
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of notice are purely matters of forum law, this Article will focus primarily
on the issues relating to amenability.
A. JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSES
1. United States Supreme Court Decisions-New Verses to Old Songs
Although this Survey article focuses on Texas cases, two recent United
States Supreme Court decisions merit discussion. After decades of inac-
tivity on personal jurisdiction, the Court issued two jurisdictional opin-
ions in product liability claims against foreign manufacturers. Both
opinions appeared on June 27, 2011 and were heralded as new guidelines
for specific and general jurisdiction.2 However, upon closer examination
these cases do not change the law.
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro involved a worker's debilitating
injury caused allegedly by a metal shearer malfunction.3 The machine's
manufacturer, McIntyre, was an English company, which had an exten-
sive advertising presence throughout the United States, but had no direct
sales or delivery contacts with New Jersey, where the injury occurred.
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that New Jersey has jurisdiction
over a foreign manufacturer "if it knows or reasonably should know that
through its distribution scheme its products are being sold in New
Jersey."'4 Reversing that judgment, Justice Kennedy wrote the lead plu-
rality opinion for four justices, which endorsed Justice O'Connor's view
from Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court5 that stream of com-
merce was invalid as a stand-alone jurisdictional doctrine, and instead,
foreign defendants must have engaged in conduct purposefully directed
at the forum.6 Justices Breyer and Alito concurred with the reversal, but
expressly declined to fashion a new rule for stream of commerce jurisdic-
tion because the McIntyre facts were insufficient for making a formulaic
pronouncement. 7 A three-justice dissent, led by Justice Ginsburg, argued
that the plurality's ruling was inconsistent with decades of precedent, no-
tably the World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson ruling in which8 Jus-
tice Ginsburg noted, that the German manufacturer did not object to
jurisdiction despite its United States presence resembling McIntyre's. 9
Whatever clarification McIntyre may offer, the stream of commerce doc-
trine remains unchanged from Asahi and falls short of precedent because
the Court attempted to cure a plurality with another plurality. Nonethe-
2. See e.g., Keranos, LLC. v. Analog Devices, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-207-TJW, 2011 WL
4027427, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2011).
3. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011).
4. Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 591-92 (N.J. 2010).
5. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
6. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786-91 (discussing Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 112).
7. Id. at 2791-94.
8. Id. at 2802-2803.
9. Id. at 2794-2804. Both manufacturers directed their contacts toward the United
States as an entire market and both sold their products through distributors. Id. at 2802
(discussing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
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less, defendants may find language in McIntyre that gives them hope, or
at least an argument, that purposeful availment is the singular test for
specific jurisdiction.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown is the second Su-
preme Court opinion, this time a unanimous ruling by McIntyre's lead
dissenter, Justice Ginsburg.10 The case involved a bus rollover in France,
allegedly caused by defective tires manufactured in Turkey by a subsidi-
ary of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. Two male soccer players
from North Carolina died in the accident. Their parents sued in North
Carolina under theories of stream of commerce and general jurisdiction,
both of which were validated by the trial and appellate courts in North
Carolina. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the lower courts,
holding that stream of commerce does not apply when the accident and
manufacturing occurred outside the forum and the defendant merely sold
products in the forum unrelated to the accident.11 Paraphrasing Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington,1 2 the Court also unanimously rejected the
North Carolina court's assertion of general jurisdiction:1 3 "A court may
assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country)
corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affilia-
tions with the State are so 'continuous and systematic' as to render them
essentially at home in the forum State."1 4 As with McIntyre, the Court
provided no new law, stating that "[o]ur 1952 decision in Perkins v. Ben-
guet Consol. Mining Co. remains '[t]he textbook case of general jurisdic-
tion."' 15 The Court further emphasized the absence of any new
precedent by reference to its only other general jurisdiction ruling: "We
see no reason to differentiate from the ties to Texas held insufficient in
Helicopteros .... 116 The ruling does, however, provide a useful clarifica-
tion in the opening and concluding statements by linking general jurisdic-
tion requiring contacts that render defendants essentially at home.1 7
Seven cases during the Survey period cited one or both of the two Su-
preme Court opinions. Recently retired federal Judge T. John Ward led
the way with four opinions, all involving patent infringements. In two
cases, Judge Ward merely cited McIntyre in deciding jurisdiction, 18 but in
10. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
11. Id. at 2851.
12. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
13. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
14. Id. (citing Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317).
15. Id. at 2856 (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037
(D.C. Cir. 1981)).
16. Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418
(1984)).
17. "A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-coun-
try) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the
State are so 'continuous and systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the forum
State." Id. at 2851. The Court concluded that "[u]nlike the defendant in Perkins, whose
sole wartime business activity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at home
in North Carolina." Id. at 2857.
18. See Keranos, LLC. v. Analog Devices, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-207-TJW, 2011 WL
4027427, at *9-10, (E.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2011) (jurisdictional ruling stayed pending discov-
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the other two he relied on McIntyre's analytical framework. 19 Of the re-
maining three cases, the most thoroughly analyzed is Powell v. Profile
Design LLC.20 When Powell was seriously injured in a bicycle accident,
she sued Profile as the designer of the defective part. Profile, in turn,
brought a third-party action against five related companies, including the
China-based parent. The third-party defendants objected to Texas juris-
diction, and, interestingly, were joined by Powell's objection to their addi-
tion to the case. The court quoted language from McIntyre and Goodyear
in finding neither general nor specific jurisdiction over the third-party
defendants.2 '
2. Consent and Waiver
Contracting parties may agree to a forum-selection clause designating
an optional or exclusive site for litigation or arbitration. When a con-
tracting party sues in the designated forum, the clause is said to be a pro-
rogation clause, that is, one supporting the forum's jurisdiction over the
defendant. 22 When a contracting party sues in a non-selected forum in
violation of the contract, the clause is said to be a derogation clause, that
is, one undermining the forum's jurisdiction.2 3 Because derogation
clauses attack, rather than establish jurisdiction, the topic is discussed in
the section on Declining Jurisdiction. 24
Prorogation clauses establish the forum's jurisdiction, typically making
them routine. However, five Survey period cases raise noteworthy inter-
pretation issues. Crawford v. Lee provides an interesting semantics dis-
cussion of the difference between "courts of Texas" and "courts in
Texas."' 25 The clause agreed to exclusive jurisdiction of courts in Texas,
cry); Bluestone Innovations Texas, L.L.C. v. Formosa Epitaxy Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 657,661
(E.D. Tex. 2011) (jurisdiction as to one defendant but not two others).
19. Brooks & Baker, L.L.C. v. Flambeau, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-146-TJW-CE, 2011 WL
4591905 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30,2011) (patent infringement case against two Wisconsin entities
and two Wisconsin individuals). Plaintiff alleged stream-of-commerce jurisdiction against
Flambeau, but citing McIntyre's plurality discussion, the court looked beyond the stream of
commerce allegations and found that Flambeau had sufficient contacts with Texas for per-
sonal jurisdiction. The court found no jurisdiction against the other three defendants (the
corporate defendant for plaintiff's failure to allege alter ego fact and the two individual
defendants based on fiduciary shield). Rather than dismiss, the court transferred the case
to the Northern District of Ohio. Id. at *6. See also Dram Techs. LLC v. Am. I Grp., Inc.,
No. 2:10-CV-45-TJW, 2011 WL 4591902, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011) (discussed the
McIntyre plurality in finding jurisdiction over the Taiwanese defendant).
20. Powell v. Profile Design LLC, 838 F. Supp. 2d 535 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
21. Id. at 539-40. The other two cases are Gonzalez v. Reed-Joseph Int'l Co. and Am.
Preferred Servs., Inc. v. Harrison. Gonzalez v. Reed-Joseph Int'l Co., No. 4:11-CV-01094,
2011 WL 5358689, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2011) (quotes McIntyre standard but bases
dismissal on failure to plead sufficient jurisdictional facts); Am. Preferred Servs., Inc. v.
Harrison, No. 07-11-0065-CV, 2011 WL 4485463, at *4 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Sept. 28,
2011 no pet.) (quotes Goodyear language on general and specific jurisdiction in finding
specific jurisdiction against an Indiana financial advisor).
22. PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICr OF LAWS 534 (5th ed. 2010).
23. Id.
24. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.




and when the plaintiff filed in federal court the defendant objected that
federal courts might be "in Texas" but were not "of Texas." The court
agreed, but nonetheless rejected the defendant's argument because it
reached an absurd result in light of the forum clause's additional language
agreeing to exclusive federal court venue in Texas.2 6
Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. v. Mascola involved dual forum
clauses in Texas and New Jersey, and when the plaintiff filed in Texas, the
defendant objected to the clause's ambiguity.2 7 The court disagreed and
held the clause was permissive and allowed either party to file in either
state, but that once filed, the other party had waived any right to object.28
Inspirus, L.L. C. v. Egan carefully examined the contract's scope and after
finding that the plaintiff had properly (but barely) stated a claim arising
under the contract, the court also asserted pendent personal jurisdiction
over the plaintiff's related non-contract claims.2 9 In Safety-Kleen Systems,
Inc. v. McCoy Freightliner, Inc., an action for nonpayment of an oil-spill
cleanup in West Virginia, the Texas forum clause withstood the defen-
dant's objections of fraud and deception, in part because the clause was
just above defendant's signature.30 Crithfield v. Boothe held that Florida
resident Crithfield was personally subject to the Texas forum clause be-
cause he failed to designate his corporate capacity when signing the
contract.31
Two Survey period cases noted that forum clauses in arbitration agree-
ments are implied consent to jurisdiction in court actions, even when the
arbitration is not pursued; however, one case denied jurisdiction because
the clause was illusory. 32
3. Texas Long-Arm and Minimum Contacts
Texas uses "limits-of-due-process" long-arm statutes, meaning that the
minimum contacts test is the only necessary foundation for personal juris-
diction in Texas. 33 Texas long-arm statutes also apply in Texas federal
26. Id. at *4-5.
27. Fin. Cas. & Sur., Inc. v. Mascola, No. H-11-0120. 2011 WL 3020934, at *2 (S.D.
Tex. June 22, 2011).
28. Id.
29. Inspirus, L.L.C. v. Egan, No. 4:11-CV-417-A, 2011 WL 4439603, at *3-5 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 20, 2011). The court further held that the forum clause did not apply to defendant's
corporation because it was not a party to the contract, and thus dismissed all claims against
the corporation. Id. at *6.
30. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. McCoy Freightliner, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-608, 2011 WL
665812, at *6-7 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2011).
31. Crithfield v. Boothe, 343 S.W.3d 274, 291 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.).
32. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Rasche, 273 F.R.D. 391, 395-96 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Dell
Mktg., L.P. v. Incompass IT, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 2d 648, 656-57 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (no juris-
diction because of illusory clause).
33. See U-Anchor Adver., Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977). The primary
Texas long-arm statutes are found at sections 17.041-045 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code and others are scattered throughout Texas statutes. TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE §§ 17.041-.045 (West 2008); e.g., TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 161.132 (West
2004) (violation of certain agricultural statutes); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.305 (West
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courts, except where Congress has enacted a federal long-arm statute for
certain federal law claims.34
The Survey period's most factually complex case is Dugas Limited
Partnership v. Dugas.35 Dugas dealt with two out-of-state trusts in Ken-
tucky and Florida; two intertwined families, which included some Texas
residents, disputed property (both marital and probate) in Texas, Ken-
tucky, and Delaware; an ongoing Kentucky probate; and entity and indi-
vidual parties in all of those states. The facts are otherwise too
complicated for this brief survey. But, in light of the recent Goodyear
decision, it is worth noting that the appellate majority found general juris-
diction over one defendant, the Dugas Limited Partnership, a Delaware
limited partnership which was controlled by a general partner based in
Tennessee, and had no property or assets in Texas. 36 Justice Walker dis-
sented to that one aspect of the decision, and argued that the majority
based its finding of general jurisdiction on a ten-year-old statement in the
limited partnership agreement that Dugas, L.P maintained its principal
place of business in Aubrey, Texas.37 The dissent pointed out that despite
the principal place of business statement, the limited partnership never
had an office in Texas, had no assets in Texas, and the undisputed facts
showed that it was a Delaware entity with a general partner based in
Tennessee.38
Vendever LLC v. Intermatic Manufacturing Ltd. illustrates how mini-
mum the contacts can be. 39 Vendever, a Nevada company, is the only
seller of cotton candy vending machines in the United States. In 2011 it
sued defendants based in the United Kingdom for disparagement and un-
fair trade practices. Vendever chose Texas as the forum based on defend-
ants' single sale of machines to a buyer based in Irving, Texas. In denying
defendants' objection to Texas jurisdiction, the court stated that
"[a]lthough the Complaint alleges only this single contact within the
Northern District, the alleged sale demonstrates that Intermatic purpose-
fully directed its activities and contract towards Texas .... ,40
2006) (nonresident respondents in divorce actions); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 823.457 (West
2009) (violations of duties imposed on insurance holding companies).
34. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (state long-arms in federal court) & FED. R. Civ. P.
4(k)(2)(A)-(B) (federal long-arm statutes). Examples of federal long-arm statutes include
28 U.S.C. § 2361 for statutory interpleader and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa for claims under the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Supp. 2011).
35. Dugas Ltd. P'ship v. Dugas, 341 S.W.3d 504, 508-10, 520-21 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2011, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.).
36. Id. at 515.
37. Id. at 521 (Walker, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 521-26. A second Survey period case also finds general jurisdiction over two
defendants based on facts that might not pass the Goodyear standard, although one defen-
dant's jurisdiction is substantiated by a convincing specific jurisdiction analysis. See Trans-
place Tex., L.P. v. Higgins, No. 4:10-CV-428, 2011 WL 623172, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 19,
2011).
39. Vendever LLC v. Intermatic Mfg. Ltd., No. 3:11-CV-201-B, 2011 WL 4346324
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2011).
40. Id. at *3.
20121
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WesternGeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp.4 1 is a pre-Goodyear
opinion that would likely satisfy the Supreme Court's "at-home" para-
digm for general jurisdiction. This was a patent infringement claim in
which six of the defendants had related entity structures, four based in
Houston and two in Norway. The court denied the Norwegian entities'
jurisdictional objection because of their ongoing interactions with their
Houston-based entities, one entity listing a Houston address, and their
otherwise substantial Texas presence. 42 It is notable, however, that the
plaintiff used the Hague Convention to serve process on the two defend-
ants, 43 suggesting either a minimal presence anywhere in the United
States, or alternatively an under-the-table Texas presence within the
Houston-based entities.
Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc. v. Flores presents the interesting
feature of a post-trial jurisdictional objection. 44 The case began as a
lender's mortgage foreclosure against defendants' manufactured homes
but expanded to include intervenors Maria and Arturo Trevino who al-
leged that the plaintiff lender and Clayton Homes, Inc. (a new party) had
engaged in wrongful and related torts.45 Clayton is a Delaware corpora-
tion with no offices in Texas and was brought into the case with a RICO
claim and its federal long-arm statute based on nationwide contacts
rather than Texas contacts. 46 During trial the court dismissed the RICO
claim, followed by a jury verdict for the Trevinos and the original defen-
dant homeowners. Clayton filed a post-trial objection to jurisdiction
based on the RICO claim's dismissal. The court rejected the Trevino's
argument that Clayton had waived a timely objection, but found instead
that the court had jurisdiction because all elements of the Texas long-arm
statute and due process were satisfied. 47
In re Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. provides a useful discussion of
the jurisdiction and choice-of-law problems that can arise in Multi-Dis-
trict Litigation (MDL) cases. 48 When Heartland, a credit-card transac-
tion processor, had its database criminally hacked, several consumers
sued for negligence and related claims. The cases in numerous federal
districts around the country were transferred to the Southern District of
41. WesternGeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 776 F. Supp. 2d 342 (S.D. Tex.
2011).
42. Id. at 348-49, 358-61.
43. Id. at 348 (referring to the Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extraju-
dicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361).
44. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. v. Flores, 789 F. Supp. 2d 750 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
45. Id. at 756.
46. Id. at 765 (referring to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006), and its long-arm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d) (2006)).
The opinion does not identify Clayton Homes' principal place of business.
47. Id. at 765-68.
48. In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., No. H-10-171, 2011 WL 1232352 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 31, 2011). The opinion also discusses the choice-of-law difficulties in MDL cases,
both with interstate conflicts and federal circuit differences, but held that no such conflicts
were apparent in this case. Id. at *4, n.5. MDL is a means of managing pretrial matters in
complex disputes filed in multiple federal districts, with the Judicial Panel on MDL deter-
mining eligibility under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006).
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Texas under the MDL statute for pre-trial matters and, after the transfer,
several financial institutions brought related claims by filing directly into
the MDL consolidated cases. 49 Heartland, a Missouri corporation based
in Clayton, Missouri, objected to personal jurisdiction in the Southern
District. The court noted that jurisdiction in MDL cases ordinarily traced
to the transferor district, that is, if defendant is amenable where originally
sued, then defendant is amenable to adjudication of pre-trial matters in
the transferor court. 50 That rule did not apply here because the financial
institution plaintiffs had filed directly into the MDL case.51 The financial
institution plaintiffs argued that Heartland's objection was merely a tactic
delay since it could be sued in a Missouri federal court and then have the
action transferred to the Southern District of Texas. However valid that
point might be, the court held that jurisdiction could not be based on the
anticipation of later-acquired jurisdiction.52 The court conducted an ex-
haustive analysis of specific jurisdiction in a variety of cases and con-
cluded that specific jurisdiction for damage to the financial institution
plaintiffs' claims could not be based on Heartland's sparse, related con-
tacts in Texas. 53 The court also conducted a brief general jurisdiction
analysis, applying the rigid approach, later adopted by the United States
Supreme Court, rejecting general jurisdiction as well.5 4
In other decisions, four courts applied the fiduciary shield doctrine; 55
two found pendent personal jurisdiction, 56 one found specific jurisdiction
over a New York art dealer for a misrepresentation in a sale to a Houston
49. Id. at *4.
50. Id. at *3.
51. Id. at *4.
52. Id. at *5.
53. Id. at *5-13.
54. Id. at *14. The court noted that its conclusion of no specific or general jurisdiction
did not require dismissal, but instead allowed for wrong-venue transfer to an appropriate
federal district from which it could be transferred back to the Southern District of Texas.
Id. (citing Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007)).
55. The fiduciary shield doctrine is that "an individual's transaction of business within
the state solely as a corporate officer does not create personal jurisdiction over that indi-
vidual though the state has in personam jurisdiction over the corporation." Stuart v.
Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1197 (5th Cir. 1985). The court in Crithfield v. Boothe, rejected
the fiduciary shield defense for the Florida director of an investment company because the
doctrine does not apply to tortious acts, and because the director signed a contract with a
Texas forum clause in his personal capacity and not as a corporate officer. Crithfield v.
Boothe, 343 S.W.3d 274, 287,291 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.; accord Transplace Tex.,
L.P. v. Higgins, No. 4:10-CV-428, 2011 WL 623172, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2011). In 21st
Century Financial Services, Inc. v. Mandelbaum, the court imposed the fiduciary shield
doctrine to exempt defendants who were not subject to the forum clause in an action to
enforce an arbitration award against a California bank and its officers. 21st Century Finan-
cial Services, Inc. v. Mandelbaum, No. A-10-CA-803, 2011 WL 3844209, at *7 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 30, 2011).
56. Personal jurisdiction must be present not only for each defendant but for each
claim against each defendant. The doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction allows a court
to adjudicate related claims against a defendant once it finds personal jurisdiction over one
claim. See Pension Advisory Grp., Ltd. v. Country Life Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 2d 680,
695-96 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (pendent personal jurisdiction over contract claim in a patent in-
fringement action); Inspirus, L.L.C. v. Egan, No. 4:11-CV-417-A, 2011 WL 4439603, at
*3-5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2011).
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plaintiff,57one denied specific jurisdiction over a Minnesota company,58
and five dismissed defendants for plaintiff's failure to plead prima facie
jurisdictional facts. 59
4. Internet-Based Jurisdiction
A number of American jurisdictions, including Texas and the Fifth Cir-
cuit, apply the Zippo sliding scale to assess personal jurisdiction based on
Internet contacts. 60 The Survey period produced four cases in which the
plaintiffs' jurisdictional arguments were based primarily on the Internet.
Wilkerson v. RSL Funding, L.L.C. examined internet contacts based on
the defendant's use of a third-party-site and found it could not support
jurisdiction. 61 Wilkerson's daughter, a California resident, won the Cali-
fornia state lottery. RSL, a Houston-based company, contacted the
daughter by mail and offered to pay her a lump sum in exchange for a
portion of her future lottery payments. When Wilkerson's daughter had
a bad experience dealing with RSL, he posted negative reviews on two
websites. Wilkerson thought he was posting his reviews on RSL's web-
57. Max Protetch, Inc. v. Herrin, 340 S.W.3d 878, 887, 889 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (contacts included defendant corporation's president making personal
trips to Houston to meet with the buyer).
58. Orix Pub. Fin., LLC v. Lake Cnty. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., No. 3:I1-CV-
0678-D, 2011 WL 3628958, at *7-8 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2011) (plaintiff's unilateral perform-
ance of its contractual duties in Texas not enough to support specific jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants regarding contract centered in Minnesota).
59. See Hoffman v. L & M Arts, 774 F. Supp. 2d 826, 844-45 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (a
lawsuit regarding breach of confidentiality agreement at auction in London, insufficient
jurisdictional allegations regarding the Sotheby's auctioneer); Larsen v. Cr~me de la
Cr~me, Inc., No. 4:09-CV-613, 2011 WL 255544, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2011) (in an
employment dispute, no prima facie jurisdictional facts over Colorado-based parent corpo-
ration regarding its management of local subsidiaries); Abramov v. Otis Elevator Co., No.
3:11-CV-440-D, 2011 WL 5081560, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2011) (insufficient facts for
Texas general jurisdiction for injuries sustained in an elevator fall in Caesars Palace in Las
Vegas, Nevada); Robinson v. Castle, No. H-11-649, 2011 WL 3813292, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug.
29, 2011) (in a dental malpractice action, defendant's post-operative communications with
plaintiff after his move to Texas did not support general or specific jurisdiction); Bazemore
v. Edwards, No. EP-10-CV-0291-FM, 2011 WL 2532785, at *5 (W.D. Tex. May 18, 2011) (in
a prisoner's civil rights action for mistreatment during earlier incarceration in Oklahoma
facility, no jurisdiction over prison official).
60. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997). The test breaks down Internet use into a spectrum of three areas. One end of the
spectrum finds the defendant clearly doing business in the forum based on contracts en-
tered into with forum residents; the spectrum's other end is passive websites not involving
the defendant's intentional contact with the forum and not leading to jurisdiction. Id. The
spectrum's difficult middle involves the forum resident's exchange of information with the
defendant's host computer, and jurisdiction is based on the level of interactivity and the
commercial nature of the information exchanged. Id. The Fifth Circuit adopted the Zippo
test in Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC. Mink v. AAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir.
1999). Texas appellate courts have used it as well. See, e.g., Townsend v. Univ.
Hosp.-Univ. of Colo., 83 S.W.3d 913, 922 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied); Ex-
perimental Aircraft Ass'n v. Doctor, 76 S.W.3d 496, 506-07 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2002, no pet.), remanded sub nom.; Doctor v. Pardue, 186 S.W.3d 4 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
61. Wilkerson v. RSL Funding, L.L.C., No. 01-10-01001-CV, 2011 WL 3516147 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 11, 2011, pet. filed).
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site, but in fact he was posting on a Yahoo! page and a Yelp website. 62
RSL sued Wilkerson in Houston, and he objected to jurisdiction.63 Al-
though the court found the websites to be interactive, it also held defen-
dant's use was passive.64 Thus, the court found the sliding scale
inappropriate to evaluate an individual web user's jurisdictional contacts
when the Internet use was directed at third-party websites.65
Tempur-Pedic International, Inc. v. Go Satellite Inc. illustrates a more
basic application of the sliding scale-the finding of personal jurisdiction
based on the interactivity of the website.66 Plaintiffs sued the defendants
for trademark violations, under the Lanham Act and Texas law, because
they were selling Tempur-Pedic mattresses over the Internet without au-
thorization.67 Go Satellite admitted its website was interactive; it allowed
orders to be placed and communication via live chats and email.68 Go
Satellite, however, had an interesting defense. It claimed that the sales to
the Texas-based customers in the underlying suit were manufactured by
the plaintiffs to create jurisdiction by hiring a private investigator to
purchase a mattress from Go Satellite online.69 Plaintiffs responded with
evidence of at least three other mattresses sold to Texas residents. The
defendants' sales agent admitted this fact, 70 compelling the conclusion
that the defendants were subject to Texas jurisdiction.71
Two other Survey period cases found no jurisdiction based on Internet
contacts. Buckeye Aviation, L.L.C. v. Barrett Performance Aircraft, Inc.72
involved a Texas company's suit for breach of warranty relating to the
servicing of aircraft engines performed by defendants in Oklahoma. Al-
though the court found that the defendants operated a Zippo middle-
ground site, the plaintiff's attempt to base jurisdiction on the defendants'
website failed because73 there was no evidence that plaintiff, or any other
Texas customer, had made contact through their website. 74 In Riverside
Exports, Inc. v. B.R. Crane & Equipment, LLC the court deemed the
62. Id. at *1-2.
63. Id. at *3.
64. Id. at *6. The court noted that the interactive features of Yahoo! and Yelp are the
creations of the owners and operators and cannot be imputed to an individual user for the
purpose of establishing minimum contacts with Texas. Id.
65. Id.
66. Tempur-Pedic Int'l, Inc. v. Go Satellite Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d 366 (N.D. Tex. 2010).
67. Id. at 370.
68. Id. Go Satellite's website allowed ordering and payment online, offered shipping
to Texas, had "live chat" pop-up windows, advertised a toll-free number and email corre-
spondence, and offered shipping anywhere in the forty-eight contiguous states at no extra
charge. Id.
69. Id. at 374-75.
70. Id. at 375.
71. Id. at 377.
72. Buckeye Aviation, L.L.C. v. Barrett Performance Aircraft, Inc., No. 09-10-00247-
CV, 2011 WL 2420987 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
73. Id. at *4. Defendant's site provided advertising and information regarding their
products, contact information and allowed customers to request additional information as
well as price quotes. Id.
74. Id. at *8.
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website at the far end of the Zippo scale, finding it purely informational,
and thus, did not support jurisdiction.75
5. Federal Long-Arm Statutes and Nationwide Contacts
Texas long arm statutes apply in both state and federal courts in
Texas,76 except where Congress has enacted a federal long-arm statute77
or where a foreign defendant lacks jurisdictional contacts with any state
but has sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole. 78 Three
Survey period cases illustrate these rules, although none are significant
for making new law. KBR Inc. v. Chevedden is a declaratory judgment
action by a corporation that wished to exclude its shareholders' contro-
versial proposal in its proxy materials.79 Shareholder Chevedden was a
California resident who objected to jurisdiction in the action filed in a
Houston federal court, even though KBR held its annual meeting there.80
The court summarily rejected Chevedden's objection because his Califor-
nia residence was all that was necessary to subject him to Congress's na-
tionwide long-arm statute for securities cases. 81
In re Enron Corp. Securities Derivative & ERISA Litigation is an action
originally filed in a Tennessee state court against various Enron defend-
ants for fraud and related claims.82 Enron's bankruptcy directors re-
moved the action to the Middle District of Tennessee, and from there, it
was transferred to the Southern District of Texas as an MDL case.8 3 Be-
cause MDL jurisdiction is derivative of the transferor court's jurisdiction,
defendant Andrew Fastow objected that he lacked minimum contacts
with Tennessee.84 The court again summarily rejected this argument
based on the bankruptcy statute's nationwide long-arm statute for re-
lated-to bankruptcy litigation. 85
In Bluestone Innovations Texas, L.L.C. v. Formosa Epitaxy, Inc. the
court rejected Texas-based jurisdiction over all of the three Taiwanese
defendants accused of patent infringement,8 6 but used the federal long-
arm statute in Rule 4(k)(2) to find jurisdiction based on nationwide con-
tacts over one of those defendants.8 7 In finding jurisdiction, the court
75. Riverside Exports, Inc. v. B.R. Crane & Equip., LLC, 362 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).
76. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
77. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C). Examples of federal long arm statutes include 28
U.S.C. § 2361 for statutory interpleader and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa for claims under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006).
78. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
79. KBR Inc. v. Chevedden, 776 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
80. Id. at 421.
81. Id. at 422-23 (citing to 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006)).
82. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., Nos. H-01-3624, H-03-2345,
2011 WL 3516292, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2011).
83. Id.
84. Id. at *3.
85. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006)).
86. Bluestone Innovations Tex., L.L.C. v. Formosa Epitaxy Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 657,
662, 655-7 (E.D. Tex. 2011).
87. Id. at 664.
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stated that the defendant For Epi "delivered its allegedly infringing prod-
ucts into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they would be
purchased in the United States. ' 88 Because the opinion's author led
Texas in enlightened discussions during this Survey period of McIntyre
and cited McIntyre in this opinion, 89 it is likely that the court's use of
stream of commerce was descriptive rather than a legal reference.
B. DECLINING JURISDICrION
Even where all jurisdictional elements exist, courts may refrain from
litigating cases: involving sovereign foreign governments, contractually
directed at other forums, where convenience dictates another forum, and
parallel to other litigation.
1. Derogating Forum-Selection Clauses
The Consent section above discusses forum-selection clauses that es-
tablish local jurisdiction;90 however, somewhat different considerations
arise when the plaintiff sues in a forum contrary to the parties' earlier
choice in a forum-selection clause. These are known as derogation
clauses (in regard to that forum). Instead of justifying the court's reten-
tion of the case, derogation clauses require that the court consider declin-
ing its otherwise valid jurisdiction over the parties. During the Survey
period, Texas courts dismissed three cases filed in Texas in spite of forum
clauses designating forums in Germany, 91 Delaware,92 and Maryland. 93
2. Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals
Forum non conveniens, or inconvenient forum, is a common law objec-
tion to jurisdiction based on significant inconvenience to one or more
defendants. It is also available by statute in the federal system and in
many states for intra-jurisdictional transfers that do not require dismis-
88. Id.
89. Id. at 660-61.
90. See supra Part I.A.2.
91. Marinor Assocs. v. M/V Panama Express was a maritime claim regarding damaged
cargo. Marinor Assocs. V. M/V Panama Express, No. H-08-1868, 2011 WL 1230158 (S.D.
Tex. Mar. 29, 2011). Plaintiff moved to nonsuit its own claim in favor of a parallel case in
Germany, citing the mandatory German forum clause, but defendant objected because of
its investment in the Texas case. Id. at *1. The court nonetheless allowed the voluntary
dismissal. Id. at *3.
92. Excel Mktg. Solutions, Inc. v. Direct Fin. Solutions, LLC involved contract and tort
claims regarding the social media platforms that served plaintiff's customers. Excel Mktg.
Solutions, Inc. v. Direct Fin. Solutions, LLC, No. 3:11-CV-0109-D, 2011 WL 1833022 (N.D.
Tex. May 13, 2011). The opinion provides a good discussion of the scope of forum clauses
in deciding to dismiss this case in favor of the mandatory Delaware forum clause. Id. at
*4-7.
93. Cotton Patch Cafr, Inc. v. Micros Sys., Inc. is a restaurant chain's action for secur-
ity breaches against a manufacturer of credit card machines. Cotton Patch Cafd, Inc. v.
Micros Sys., No. 12-10-0030-CV, 2011 WL 743066 (Tex. App.-Tyler Mar. 2, 2011, no pet.)
(mem. op.). The court dismissed the case after finding that the contract designation of an
exclusive Maryland forum complied with Texas statutory law. Id. at *3-4 (citing TEx. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 273.002 (West 2009)).
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sal.94 Where interstate or international case movement is involved, fo-
rum non conveniens is truly jurisdictional because it involves the forum's
decline of otherwise-valid jurisdiction, as well as the dismissal of the local
case, for re-filing in a distinct forum.
Because intra-federal transfers under section 1404 do not implicate
conflicts between states or nations, they are not considered here, even
though such transfers may involve significant distances. This Article is
limited to inter-jurisdictional forum non conveniens under the common
law which is available in state and federal courts in Texas under a two-
part test that requires the movant to show the availability of an adequate
alternative forum and that a balancing of private and public interests fa-
vors transfer.95
Intelligender, LLC v. Soriano, denied a forum non conveniens dismis-
sal.96 Intelligender, a Texas company that markets gender prediction
tests for expectant parents, signed a confidentiality agreement with
Farmacias Ahumada, S.A., a Chilean pharmaceutical company with more
than 1200 retail outlets in Mexico, Central America, Peru, and Chile.97
When Farmacias allegedly leaked Intelligender's confidential information
to Soriano and others, Intelligender sued Farmacias for breaching the
agreement and the other defendants for unfair trade practices. 98 After
Intelligender dismissed its claim against Farmacias, defendants brought
Farmacias back in as a third party defendant and also filed counterclaims
against Intelligender.99 Farmacias then moved for a forum non con-
veniens dismissal and argued that the action should be litigated in Chile,
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 is the federal statutory provision for inconvenient forum objec-
tions seeking transfer to another federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2006) Texas law transfers
based on convenience under sections 15.002(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 15.002(b) (West 2002).
95. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981); McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 424
(5th Cir. 2001). The private factors look to the parties' convenience and include the "rela-
tive ease of access to sources of proof; [the] availability of compulsory process for attend-
ance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witness[es]; [the]
possibility of view of premises, if ... appropriate ... ; and all other practical problems that
make trial ... easy, expeditious and inexpensive." McLennan, 245 F.3d at 424 (alterations
in original) (quoting Dickson Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 342 (5th Cir.
1999)). The public factors look to the courts' concerns and the forum state's interests, and
include the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion, the local interest in
having localized controversies decided at home, the interest in having the trial of a diver-
sity case in a forum familiar with the law that must govern the action, the avoidance of
problems in conflict of laws problems, and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unre-
lated forum with jury duty. Id. Texas forum non conveniens law is multi-faceted. Section
71.051 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applies to personal injury and
wrongful death claims. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 71.051 (West 2008). Com-
mon law forum non conveniens, in line with Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, governs all other
interstate and international forum convenience issues in Texas state courts. See In re Smith
Barney, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1998).
96. Intelligender, LLC v. Soriano, No. 2:10-CV-125-TJW, 2011 WL 903342, at *9 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 15, 2011).
97. Id. at *1.




its home forum.100 The court summarily denied the motion because the
defendants' counterclaims against Intelligender could not be litigated in
Chile.10
Routine forum non conveniens analyses included dismissals in favor of
courts in: (1) Mexico, regarding an oil rig accident in Mexican territorial
waters that injured and killed Mexican citizens; 10 2 (2) England, regarding
shareholders' derivative litigation arising from the British Petroleum acci-
dent in the Gulf of Mexico; a0 3 and (3) Florida, regarding a plane crash in
Texas but with parties, decedents, and related probate actions all based in
Florida. 0 4
III. CHOICE OF LAW
Choosing the applicable substantive law is a question-like personal
jurisdiction and judgment enforcement-involving both forum law and
constitutional issues. Understanding these issues requires a clear focus
on the basic principles. First, choice of law is a question of state law, both
in state and federal courts. 10 5 Second, it is a question of forum state law.
Renvoi-the practice of using another state's choice-of-law rule-is al-
most never employed unless the forum state directs it, and even then, the
forum state remains in control.' 0 6 Third, the forum state has broad power
to make choice-of-law decisions, either legislatively or judicially, subject
only to limited constitutional requirements. 0 7
Within the forum state's control of choice of law is a hierarchy of rules.
At the top are legislative choice-of-law rules, like statutes directing the
application of a certain state's laws based on events or people important
to the operation of each specific law.108 Second in the choice-of-law hier-
archy is party-controlled choice of law or the choice-of-law clauses in con-
100. Id. at *3.
101. Id. at *9, where the court used one paragraph to reject Farmacias's motion.
102. Dominguez v. Gulf Coast Marine & Assocs., Inc., No. 9:08-CV-200, 2011 WL
1526973, (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2011).
103. In re BP S'holder Derivative Litig., No. 4:10-CV-3447, 2011 WL 4345209 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 15, 2011).
104. Schippers v. Mazak Props., Inc., 350 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 13,
2011, pet. denied).
105. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941).
106. The Restatement (Second) creates a presumption against renvoi except for limited
circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8 (1971). Although
commentators defend the limited use of renvoi, they acknowledge its general lack of ac-
ceptance in the United States except in limited circumstances, usually found in statutes
directing the use of renvoi. See HAY, supra note 23, at 162-68; WEINTRAUB, supra note 1,
at 88-94. Texas law provides for renvoi in the Texas Business and Commerce Code. TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.105 & 2.402(b) (West 2009), 4.102(b) (West 2002 & Supp.
2011), 8.106 & 9.103 (West 2011). For federal courts, Klaxon reiterates the forum state's
control of choice of law. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496-97.
107. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1), cmt. a (1971); see e.g.,
Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex. 1999) (applying an earlier version of
the Texas wrongful death statute, requiring that the court "apply the rules of substantive
law that are appropriate under the facts of the case") (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 71.031.
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tracts, which control unless public policy dictates otherwise. 10 9 Third, in
the hierarchy, is the common law, now controlled in Texas by the most
significant relationship test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws.110 This Survey article is organized according to this hierarchy:
statutory choice-of-law, followed by choice-of-law clauses, and conclud-
ing with choice of law under the most significant relationship test. Special
issues such as constitutional limitations are discussed in the following sec-
tion. This grouping of cases results in a discussion that mixes Texas Su-
preme Court opinions with those of Texas intermediate appellate courts,
federal district courts, and the Fifth Circuit. In spite of this mix, readers
should note that because choice-of-law is a state law issue, the only bind-
ing opinions are those of the Texas Supreme Court.'11
A. LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION
Legislative jurisdiction imposes two limits on the application of any
given law. One is the limit within the law itself, or what territorial range
was this law intended to have. Common law, emanating from courts
rather than legislatures, did not have a built-in limit other than the older
concept of lex locus at a time when laws were deemed territorial. How-
ever, statutes often have an intended range, and that is the first limit of
legislative jurisdiction-the range imposed by the lawmaker.
Within the United States, the second limit on a law's range is imposed
by the United States Constitution. Similar to the due process limitation
on state long-arm statutes, 112 the Constitution imposes limits on a state's
ability to choose the governing law in its courts. Unlike the limits on
state long-arm statutes (which arise only under the due process clause),
choice-of-law limits arise under several doctrines: due process, requiring a
reasonable connection between the dispute and the governing law; full
faith and credit, requiring the choice-of-law analysis to consider the inter-
ests of other affected states; and to a lesser extent, equal protection, privi-
leges and immunities, the commerce clause, and the contract clause. 113
109. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971) (allowing con-
tracting parties to choose a governing law, within defined limits). Texas has adopted § 187.
See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Tex. 1990).
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (listing the seven
balancing factors for the most significant relationship test).
111. The exception is when a federal court rules on a constitutional issue, such as legis-
lative jurisdiction or full faith and credit, or federal questions such as foreign sovereign
immunity. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 680 (Tex. 2004)
(legislative jurisdiction).
112. See supra notes 3-17 and accompanying text.
113. The due process clause is the primary limit on state choice-of-law rules, requiring a
reasonable or at least minimal connection between the dispute and the law being applied.
See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S.
397, 410 (1930); Compaq Computer Corp., 135 S.W.3d at 680; see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 and comments following; see also HAY, supra note 23, at
175-203; WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 585-648; James P. George, Choice of Law: A Guide
for Texas Attorneys, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 833, 844-46 (1994). Choice-of-law limits under
full faith and credit are now questionable after Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. V. Hyatt.
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2003). In addition to these two limits,
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Constitutional problems most often occur when a state court chooses its
own law in questionable circumstances. But the inappropriate choice of
law is not the only conceivable constitutional issue, and even when choos-
ing foreign law, courts must apply choice-of-law rules with an eye towards
constitutional limitations.
Four cases during the Survey period dealt with legislative limits. Cot-
tonwood Financial Ltd. v. Cash Store Financial Services, Inc. dealt with
both self-imposed and constitutional limits.n 4 This was a trademark case
considering the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act. Texas-
based Cottonwood operates payday lender services in seven states includ-
ing Texas, using the trade name "Cash Store."'" 5 Canada-based Cash
Store Financial Services, Inc. (CSFS) provides the same service in Ca-
nada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, originally using the names "B
& B Capital" and "Rentcash," but switching to "The Cash Store" around
2001.116 Both lenders operated independently and without interference
until CSFS expanded its activities into the United States, including at-
tracting American investors, and in 2010 registering in the New York
Stock Exchange as "The Cash Store Financial Services, Inc." 117
Responding to those activities, Cottonwood sued in a Dallas federal
court for trademark infringement and related violations of Texas law. 118
In ruling on Cottonwood's motion for a temporary injunction, the court
noted both Congressional intent and the constitutional basis for the Lan-
ham Act's extraterritorial application.119 The court further noted that
Cottonwood did not seek to restrain CSFS's use of the mark outside of
the United States. 120 Ironically, the scope of Cottonwood's relief was
limited not by the law's territorial range, but by Cottonwood's failure to
state a claim under the Lanham Act, leading the court to dismiss the fed-
eral claim.' 2 ' The court then ruled that Cottonwood had stated a claim
for trademark dilution under Texas law, which allowed it to retain supple-
mental jurisdiction 122 and, accordingly, issue a limited injunction on
CSFS's use of "The Cash Store" within the United States. 123
The court's ruling leaves open the question of the territorial range of
Texas law. The court observed in a footnote that there could be choice-
of-law issues involved in the nationwide application of Texas law but held
under Texas's most significant relationship test, Texas law would apply.124
international law also imposes a reasonable connection limit on choice of law. See RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402-04 (1987).
114. Cottonwood Fin. Ltd. v. Cash Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 726 (N.D. Tex.
2011).




119. Id. at 735.
120. Id. at 733, 735 n.7.
121. Id. at 740.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 740-41.
124. Id. at 760, n.55.
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This ignores the additional test under due process as explained by the
Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, which reversed the
Kansas Supreme Court's decision to apply Kansas law extraterritori-
ally.125 That is not to say that Phillips would bar the nationwide applica-
tion of Texas law here, but merely to say that further examination is
needed.
Three other cases considered only the first limit, legislative intent. In
re Fernandez was an appeal from a bankruptcy court on the issue of
homestead exemption, specifically whether the debtor, now living in
Texas, could claim an exemption under Nevada law. 126 The bankruptcy
court ruled against the debtor on an analysis that exemption laws could
never be applied extraterritorially. 127 The district court reversed, noting
that case law had developed three approaches on this question: (1) ex-
emption laws could never be applied extraterritorially (which the court
observed was unique to the bankruptcy court from which this appeal
came); (2) federal law intended to allow extraterritorial application if the
state law also intended that; and (3) federal law gave state exemptions
extraterritorial effect regardless of the state's intention. 28 The district
court adopted the second ground and then turned to the question of
whether Nevada intended its exemption law to be applied to Texas prop-
erty, which it answered in the affirmative.12 9 In another Survey period
case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the opposite result, not
on Congressional intent, but on the point that Florida did not intend for
its exemption law to apply outside of Florida. 130 Abecassis v. Wyatt of-
fered a quick conclusion in dismissing private claims under the Anti-Ter-
rorism Act because it did not apply to foreign entities engaged in
financial transactions with the Iraqi government. 131
B. STATUTORY CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
Statutory choice-of-law rules, especially those dictating the application
of forum law, express a public policy interest about governing law. These
statutory directives should be applied no matter what the parties plead.
Seven Survey period cases illustrate the courts' careful adherence even
where the parties conceded Texas law's application, going out of their
way to note the mandate that Texas law applied apart from the claims
raised by the parties. 32
Three of the cases involved a federal statutory choice of law and are
125. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822-23 (1985).
126. In re Fernandez, No. EP-11-CV-123-KC, 2011 WL 3423373 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5,
2011).
127. In re Fernandez, 445 B.R. 790, 795 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011).
128. Fernandez, 2011 WL 3423373, at *6.
129. Id. at *22-27.
130. In re Camp, 631 F.3d 757, 760 (5th Cir. 2011).
131. Abecassis v. Wyatt, 785 F. Supp. 2d 614, 648 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
132. See supra notes 113-132 and accompanying text.
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discussed in the Legislative Jurisdiction section above.133 The remaining
four cases involved the Texas Insurance Code's directive that any insur-
ance policy payable to a citizen or inhabitant of Texas by an insurance
company doing business in Texas be governed by Texas law.'14
Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Vitus Marine, LLC denied the appli-
cation of Texas law.135 The dispute involved an insurer that denied cover-
age for repairs made to defective welds on barges. The barges were
constructed in Houston, although the opinion is unclear as to where the
repairs occurred. The barge owners made a claim on the policy, but the
insurer won the race to the courthouse, filing a declaratory judgment ac-
tion in a Houston federal court a few hours before the claimants filed in a
federal court in Washington state.1 36 The Houston federal court granted
claimants' request for an inconvenient forum transfer, finding that the
bulk of public and private interest factors favored the Washington forum,
and rejecting the insurer's argument that the Texas Insurance Code's stat-
utory directive governed because the payee on the policy was not a Texas
resident. 137 The other three cases all involved insurers' alleged breach of
the duty to defend in varied fact patterns, all holding Texas law applicable
under the statute. 138
C. CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS
Texas law and the Restatement permit contracting parties to choose a
governing law, 139 which is reflected in twenty-three Survey-period cases.
Seventeen of those cases involve courts' summary acquiescence to the
parties' choice of law with little or no analysis, a judicial practice which
the authors have not seen before, at least not to this degree. 140 Courts
133. See id.
134. Any contract of insurance payable to any citizen or inhabitant of this State by any
insurance company or corporation doing business within this State shall be
held to be a contract made and entered into under and by virtue of the laws
of this State relating to insurance, and governed thereby, notwithstanding
such policy or contract of insurance may provide that the contract was exe-
cuted and the premiums and policy (in case it becomes a demand) should be
payable without this State, or at the home office of the company or corpora-
tion issuing the same.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (West 2009).
135. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Vitus Marine, LLC, No. H-11-3022, 2011 WL 4972025, at *4
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2011).
136. Id. at *1.
137. Id. at *3.
138. Simmons v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 420 Fed. App'x 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (breach of duty to defend in a sales agent dispute with Quixtar, formerly known as
Amway); Millis Dev. & Constr., Inc. v. Am. First Lloyd's Ins. Co., 809 F. Supp. 2d 616,625
(S.D. Tex. 2011) (action by co-insurer on duty to defend in personal injury lawsuit); Sigma
Marble & Granite-Houston, Inc., v. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co., No. H-09-3942, 2010 WL
5464257, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2010) (commercial general liability insurance, breach of
duty to defend plaintiff for disputes related to plaintiff's renovation work on a Houston
hotel).
139. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
140. The seventeen, on file with the author, comprise three cases from the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, cases from the Northern, Southern, and Eastern Districts of Texas, and
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arguably can take such action where the parties do not object, and courts
are entitled to take judicial notice of sister-state law. 141 The Restate-
ment, however, makes it clear that parties' contractual choices of law do
not control if another state has a more significant relationship to the dis-
pute. 142 In a 2006 per curiam opinion, the Fifth Circuit noted the need to
conduct an analysis rather than accepting the parties' concession: "[A]
federal court has an obligation to apply the forum state's choice-of-law
rules even if the parties are in agreement as to the controlling law."'143
That court further held that "[u]nder Texas choice-of-law principles, con-
tractual choice-of-law clauses are given effect if the law chosen by the
parties (1) has a reasonable relationship to the parties and the chosen
state and (2) is not contrary to a fundamental policy of the state. 1 44 The
Southern District's Judge Hughes, in an opinion rendered during this Sur-
vey period, provided a more accurate statement for the second element
of that test: "[T]he parties' choice of law applies unless its application is
contrary to the laws of a state with a materially greater interest in the
transaction. 1 145 That means the parties' chosen state must bear a reason-
able relationship to the dispute, and the application of the chosen state's
law must not override a fundamental policy of any state (forum or other-
wise) which has a more significant relationship to the parties or the
dispute.
Along with the seventeen, the Survey period produced six good analyt-
ical examples of choice-of-law clauses and one, Quicksilver Resources,
Inc. v. Eagle Drilling, LLC 146 which left out the forum public policy con-
sideration, but was otherwise a well-done choice-of-law analysis. Quick-
silver was a dispute between an oil exploration company and a drilling
company whose interactions included both Texas and Oklahoma. As the
relationship deteriorated, Quicksilver sued Eagle on contract, fraud, and
negligence claims. Eagle counterclaimed on the contract and added re-
lated claims of tortious interference, false light, invasion of privacy, and
other claims, and then added Quicksilver's officers, directors, and em-
ployees as third party defendants on the same tort claims. 147 In an earlier
opinion in the case, the court had ruled that the contract's Oklahoma
one case from a Texas court of appeals, indicating that this is primarily a federal and not a
state practice. Appellate courts have jurisdiction only on the points raised on appeal, but a
court's statement that "[t]he parties agree that, pursuant to the choice-of-law provision of
the Lease, Ohio law governs .... indicates that the issue was not considered at the trial
court.," Alameda Mall, L.P. v. Shoe Show, Inc., 649 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 2011).
141. See FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1; TEX. R. EVID. 202.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 187 (1971).
143. Provident Fin., Inc. v. Strategic Energy L.L.C., 404 Fed. App'x 835, 839 n.5 (5th
Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Caton v. Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 942 (5th Cir. 1990)).
144. Id. at 839 (citing Int'l Interests, L.P. v. Hardy, 448 F.3d 303, 306-07 (5th Cir.
2006)).
145. Griffin v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. H-09-03842, 2011 WL 675285, at *1
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2011) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 187(2)(b) (1971)).
146. Quicksilver Res., Inc. v. Eagle Drilling, LLC, 792 F. Supp. 2d 948, 951-57 (S.D.
Tex. 2011).
147. Id. at 951-54.
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choice-of-law clause was valid and governed the contract claims. 1 48
When addressing which law governed the various tort claims, the court
did a thorough review of Texas case law on the application of choice-of-
law clauses to tort claims. Noting the clause's reference to the parties'
relationship rather than the contract, the court held that the clause was
sufficiently broad to cover the range of contract and tort claims between
the companies. 149 What is missing is a consideration of Oklahoma law
overriding the fundamental policy of another state, in this case Texas.
Assuming that the court's prior order on the contract claims did such an
analysis, that order does not cover the public policy concerns that might
occur with the tort claims.
The six Survey period cases with appropriate contract clause analysis
include a variety of fact patterns, including a Texas probate in which
Michigan law governed the right of survivorship to decedent's employee-
investment plan;150 a personal injury claim arising in Texas with Maryland
law governing the indemnity claim; 151 a non-compete agreement for per-
formance in Texas governed by Illinois law; 1 52 the breach of a software
licensing agreement governed by Ohio law, while Texas law applied to
the tort claims;153 and-in a more complex analysis-a federal claim for
overtime pay where federal law governed, with deference to the con-
tract's chosen Texas law.154
D. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST
In the absence of a statutory choice-of-law rule or an effective choice-
of-law clause, Texas courts apply the most significant relationship test1 55
from the Restatement. 156
1. Contract-Based Claims
The Survey period produced only two contract cases not involving a
valid choice-of-law clause. Premier Tierra Holdings, Inc. v. Ticor Title
148. Id. at 952.
149. Id. at 952-53.
150. McKeehan v. McKeehan, 355 S.W.3d 282, 284 (Tex. App.-Austin 2011, no pet.).
151. CMA-CGM (Am.) Inc. v. Empire Truck Lines, Inc., No. 01-10-00077-CV, 2011
WL 1631961, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] April 28, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
152. Johnson Serv. Grp., Inc. v. France, 763 F. Supp. 2d 819, 825 (N.D. Tex. 2011).
153. Fagan Holdings, Inc. v. Thinkware, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 2d 820, 825 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
154. Champion v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 2:08-CV-417-TJW, 2010 WL 4736908, at
*3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2010).
155. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 678 (Tex. 1990).
156. The embodiment of the most significant relationship test is seven factors to be
balanced according to the needs of the particular case. They are: "(a) the needs of the
interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant
policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determina-
tion of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result,
and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971). This listing is not by priority, which varies
from case to case. Id. at cmt. c. In a larger sense, the most significant relationship test
includes the other choice-of-law sections throughout the Restatement.
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Insurance Co. of Florida is a claim for breach of diligence in curing title
defects regarding property in Florida.1 57 Premier argued that Texas law
controlled and that it was much the same as Florida law. The court dis-
agreed, noting the silence of Florida law on crucial issues. The court then
conducted a straightforward, one-paragraph analysis under Restatement
section 188 with no mention of the most significant relationship test in
section 6, although section 6 would likely support the court's choice of
Florida law.158 The court relied on the absence of on-point Florida law to
interpret the contract with its own language and denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment.159
Pride Transportation v. Continental Casualty Co. 160 illustrates a federal
court's use of the transferor state's choice-of-law rule after an inconve-
nient forum transfer from a federal court in Utah. The transferee Texas
federal court applied Utah's choice-of-law rule to a claim of inadequate
legal defense related to an automobile accident in Texas, holding that
Texas law governed-which is no surprise since the Texas contacts also
dictated venue transfer to Texas.16'
2. Commercial Torts
In City of Clinton, Arkansas v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 62 the city sued
Pilgrim's Pride in bankruptcy court for closing its facility in Clinton, alleg-
ing fraud in order to manipulate commodity prices. The action arose in
Arkansas, but Clinton had to file in the bankruptcy court in Texas, from
which it was withdrawn and transferred to a district court that dismissed
the claims. 163 On appeal, the court bypassed the apparent choice-of-law
issue and held that Clinton did not state a claim under Arkansas law,
allowing for dismissal without needing to assess the conflicts question. 164
Choice of law ordinarily resolves substantive issues, but in Northview
Christian Church, Inc. v. Monolithic Constructors, Inc., the court had to
use a Restatement analysis to resolve what is usually considered a proce-
dural issue-the joinder of third party defendants. 165 The plaintiff was an
Alabama church that engaged a number of contractors to design and con-
struct two dome-shaped church buildings in Dothan, Alabama. At the
project's conclusion, the church was unhappy with the results and filed
suit in a federal court in Dallas based on Texas being the home of two of
the defendants. 166 When the defendants moved to designate a new party,
157. Premier Tierra Holdings, Inc. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. of Fla., No. 4:09-CV-02872,
2011 WL 2313206, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 9, 2011).
158. Id. at *2.
159. Id. at *8-9.
160. Pride Transp. V. Cont'l Cas. Co., 804 F. Supp. 2d 520, 527 (N.D. Tex. 2011).
161. Id.
162. City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 151 (5th Cir. 2010).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 153-57, 153 n.2.
165. Northview Christian Church, Inc. v. Monolithic Constructors, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-
00655-M, 2011 WL 4485419, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2011).
166. Id. at *1-2.
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Saliba Construction, as a responsible third party, the plaintiff objected on
the grounds that Alabama law did not allow such joinder. The court
characterized the issue as one of substantive law, based on the viability of
the third party claims under the controlling substantive law, which called
for the application of the Restatement's basic tort claim analyses under
sections 6 and 145. Examining those factors, the court concluded Ala-
bama law controlled, and accordingly, denied defendants' motion to join
responsible third parties. 167
Quicksilver Resources, Inc. v. Eagle Drilling, LLC is an oil patch dis-
pute reported above in the Contractual Choice-of-Law Clause section.168
After determining that the parties' choice of Oklahoma law governed
both the contract and tort claims between the companies, the court still
had to consider the related tort claims against the individual defendants
who were not subject to the choice-of-law clause. 169 In spite of its too-
brief analysis of the choice-of-law clause, the court performed a textbook
analysis of the extra-clause claims. Specifically, the court identified mate-
rial conflicts between Oklahoma and Texas law on the claims against
Quicksilver's individual parties. 170 The court further analyzed under the
Restatement and found Oklahoma law governed Eagle's false represen-
tation claim against the individual defendants, but Texas law applied to
Eagle's claims of tortious interference, conspiracy, and false light invasion
of privacy against the individual defendants.171
Two bankruptcy cases applied the Restatement's tort principles to ad-
verse claims regarding fraudulent transfers in the failure of a European
power plant1 72 and a garden variety of claims in debtors' joint actions
against a billing services company. 173
3. Non-Commercial Torts
Black v. Toys R Us-Delaware, Inc. 174 offers the Survey period's most
instructive opinion on using the Restatement. The Blacks bought a
Bumbo Seat at defendant's store in North Carolina and subsequently
moved to California. While in California, the child fell out of the seat and
struck her head, causing a serious injury. Under doctor's advice, the
167. Id. at *2-3.
168. Quicksilver Res., Inc. v. Eagle Drilling, LLC, 792 F. Supp. 2d 948, 950-51 (S.D.
Tex. 2011).
169. Id. at 951.
170. Id. at 954.
171. In addition to Restatement (Second) section 6 (the most significant relationship
test), the court applied sections 145 (the basic tort principle) & 148 (fraud and misrepre-
sentation). Id. at 953-57.
172. See MC Asset Recovery, LLC v. Commerzbank AG, 441 BR. 791, 805 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 2010) (using section 145 to conclude that Georgia law negated plaintiff's claim
for avoiding pre-petition transfers, applying Texas law to the negligence and misrepresen-
tation claims, and Georgia law to the contract claims).
173. See Reed v. Carecentric Nat'l, LLC (In re Soporex, Inc.), 446 B.R. 750, 761-62
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011).




mother had to awaken the child every two or three hours over the next
few days to prevent a coma. While doing this, the mother was twenty
weeks pregnant with twins and went into pre-mature labor and lost the
twins. 175 The Blacks sued in a Houston federal court (the opinion does
not explain why, but perhaps another residential change). The defend-
ants argued for the application of North Carolina law which barred recov-
ery for contributory negligence, unlike California law, which applied a
comparative fault standard. In the most thorough choice-of-law analysis
in this Survey period, the court analyzed the fact under seven Restate-
ment sections,176 yielding a discussion too long to report here. The court
concluded that California law controlled, based primarily on the location
of the accident 177 and the fact that North Carolina's contributory negli-
gence doctrine was intended to protect North Carolina manufacturers,
and none of the defendants were based in North Carolina. 178
Enterprise Products Partners, L.P. v. Mitchell was an action for wrong-
ful death, personal injury, and property damage arising from a ruptured
liquid propane pipeline in Mississippi.179 Plaintiffs sued in state court in
Houston, naming two corporate defendants based in Houston. The de-
fendants moved for the application of Mississippi law, which has a $1 mil-
lion damage cap on non-economic injuries. The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's choice of Texas law. The court applied the Restatement
(Second) sections 6, 145, 146, and 175 and concluded that the Mississippi
damage cap was designed to attract businesses to Mississippi, the rupture
could have occurred anywhere along the pipeline's 1300 mile length, and
the defendants had little presence in Mississippi other than the portion of
their pipeline.' 80
Figueroa v. Williams is a horrific fact pattern involving the death of
illegal immigrants from Mexico and Honduras who were smuggled across
the border in the back of a truck trailer that was abandoned at a gas
station in Victoria, Texas, with the occupants locked inside. 181 After the
truck driver was convicted of homicide,1 82 the decedents' families
brought claims against the truck manufacturer and owner for wrongful
death and related claims under Texas law. Analyzing the facts under Re-
statement sections 6 and 145, the court concluded that the laws of the
175. Id. at *1.
176. In addition to Restatement (Second) sections 6 and 145, the court analyzed sec-
tions 146 (personal injuries), 147 (injuries to tangible things), 148 (fraud and misrepresen-
tation), id., (tortious character of conduct), and 164 (contributory fault). Id. at *8, 11, 12,
14. The court noted that the Texas Supreme Court has not adopted all of these sections but
nonetheless found them persuasive. Id. at *11.
177. Id. at *9-10.
178. Id. at *16.
179. Enter. Prods. Partners, L.P. v. Mitchell, 340 S.W.3d 476 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2011, pet. granted).
180. Id. at 480-82.
181. Figueroa v. Williams, Nos. V-05-56 through V-05-62, 2010 WL 5387599 (S.D. Tex.
Dec. 17, 2010).
182. See United States v. Williams, 610 F.3d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 2010).
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victims' domiciles-Mexico and Honduras-should govern the assess-
ment of damages. 183
E. ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMS
SLS Shipbuilding Co. v. Ionia Management S.A. raised the interesting
question of which law governs claim characterization.' 84 This was an ac-
tion to enforce an English arbitration award for breach of contract in the
building of three ships. SLS filed the follow-up action in a Houston fed-
eral court seeking to seize defendant's unrelated property in satisfaction
of the English award. 185 Defendant Ionia objected, arguing that the
seized property was unattachable under applicable federal maritime law;
SLS responded that English law governed the identity of property that
could satisfy the English award. 186 This raised a deeper choice-of-law is-
sue as to whether the seizure was a maritime claim or merely execution
on an English judgment. The court held that federal common law gov-
erned claim characterization and did not allow for the seizure of a ship
pursuant to the breach of a contract for building other ships.
187
Marinor Associates v. M/V Panama Express was a claim for lost cargo
involving a complicated choice-of-law clause 188 with provisions designat-
ing the law of Germany, Singapore, the United States, and the Hague-
Visby Rules as alternatives. 189 In a detailed and careful analysis, the
court held that United States law governed the loss of cargo carried be-
low deck, and the Hague-Visby Rules governed the loss of cargo carried
on deck. 190
Other Survey period cases illustrated the adjacent state rule191 and the
correlating maritime law function of choosing between conflicting adja-
cent states. 19
2
183. Figueroa, 2010 WL 5387599, at *4-10.
184. SLS Shipbuilding Co. v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. H-11-271, 2011 WL 2652365 (S.D.
Tex. July 5, 2011).
185. Id. at *1
186. Id.
187. Id. at *2-4.
188. Marinor Assocs. v. M/V Panama Express, No. H-08-1868, 2011 WL 710616, at *9
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2011).
189. The original treaty is the 1924 International Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, Brussels, 25 August 1924. The Hague-Visby Rules
include the amendments of the Brussels Protocol of 1968, Brussels, 23 February 1968.
190. Mariner Assocs., 2011 WL 710616, at *9-11.
191. Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) PLC v. Tico Time Marine LLC, No. 4:10-CV-2060,
2011 WL 1044154, at *3-5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2011) (using maritime choice-of-law rules to
choose New York over Texas law on a bad faith insurance claim).
192. Two Survey period cases used the maritime law's adjacent state rule that the law of
the adjacent state is a surrogate of federal common law. Samson Contour Energy E&P,
LLC v. LEAM Drilling Systems, Inc. rejected the rule in a personal injury and indemnifi-
cation case, holding that maritime law prevailed over Louisiana law because the drilling
platform was inextricably intertwined with maritime activities. Samson Contour Energy
E&P, LLC v. LEAM Drilling Systems, Inc., No. 4:10-00671, 2010 WL 5092966, at *5-6
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2010). As a predicate, the court also held that the federal Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands Act overrode the parties' contractual choice of Oklahoma law. Id. at
*2-3. The court cited the federal act by name only, but its citation is 43 U.S.C.
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F. ENTITY INTERNAL RELATIONS
Experian Information Solutions, Inc., v. Lexington Allen, L.P. was a
commercial lease dispute in which the landlord sued the tenant for pay-
ment on property improvements.' 93 When the tenant responded that it
had insufficient funds to pay, the landlord argued that the tenant was the
alter ego of its Delaware parent entity. Although Texas law governed the
primary claims, the court applied Delaware law to the alter ego issue,
citing the Texas choice-of-law rule that veil piercing is governed by the
law of the state of incorporation. 194
Valdez v. Capital Management Services, L.P. was a consumer's action
for identity theft and related debt collection violations. 195 For the plain-
tiff's claim that an additional defendant was in a joint venture with the
lead defendant, the court applied Delaware law to determine the joint
venture's existence. 196 The court also applied Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws section 291 to issues of the duties of principal and
agent. 197
Alert 24 Security, LLC v. Tyco International, Ltd. used the state-of-
incorporation rule along with traditional Restatement analysis to deter-
mine personal jurisdiction,1 98 and three courts applied the internal affairs
doctrine calling for the application of the law of incorporation.' 99
G. OTHER CHOICE-OF-LAW ISSUES
Survey period cases dealt with a number of other choice-of-law issues,
including the primary analytical steps, such as false conflicts;2 00 pleading
§§ 1301-1356a (2009). See Energy XXI, GoM, LLC, v. New Tech Eng'g, L.P., No. H-10-
00110, 2011 WL 11197 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2011) (adjacent state rule adopting Louisiana law
in defective product claim regarding oil drilling) (example of adjacent state rule's
application).
193. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Lexington Allen L.P., No. 4:10-CV-144, 2011 WL
1627115, at *1-2 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2011).
194. Id. at *2-3 n.2 (citing Weaver v. Kellog, 216 BR. 563, 585 (S.D. Tex. 1997)).
195. Valdez v. Capital Mgmt. Servs., L.P., No. B:09-246, 2010 WL 4643272, at *1 (S.D.
Tex. Nov. 16, 2010).
196. Id. at *8.
197. Id. at *9.
198. Alert 24 Sec., LLC v. Tyco Int'l, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 2d 589, 597-97 (S.D. Tex. Oct.
18, 2011).
199. See In re Noram Res., Ins., No. 08-38222, 2011 WL 5357895, at *5-6 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. Nov. 7, 2011) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 30 (1971))
(applying Canadian law to the trustee's allegations that corporate officers breached their
duty of care); In re Skyport Global Comm., Inc. v. CenturyTel, Inc. (In re Skyport Global
Commc'ns, Inc., No. 10-03150, 2011 WL 111427, at *15 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2011)
(applying Delaware law to the predecessor corporation and Texas law to the successor);
U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 934, 942 (N.D. Tex.
2011) (applying Delaware law to claims of directors' fiduciary breaches).
200. Defining a clear, outcome-changing difference between the forum's and the for-
eign law is the first step in conducting a choice-of-law analysis, and the absence of a clear
conflict should result in the application of forum law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. i (1971); id. at § 186 cmt. c & illus. 2(demonstrating that
where there is no difference between the law of the place of contract formation and the law
of the place of performance, the two can be treated as one state); see also Phillips Petrol.
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 838 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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and proof of foreign law;20 ' and the substance and procedure distinctions,
with its heavy presumption that forum procedure governs.202 Other cases
discussed statutes of limitation,20 3 federal venue transfers,204 workers'
part). The Survey period produced five false-conflict cases on varied facts patterns. Mar-
quis v. Omniguide, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-2092-D, 2011 WL 321112, at *8 n.5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 28,
2011) (an employment discrimination suit in which both parties pleaded under Texas law
and ignored the contract's choice of Massachusetts law, with the court taking the caution-
ary step of verifying it was a false conflict); accord 1993 GF P'ship v. Simmons & Co. Int'l,
No. 14-09-00268-CV, 2010 WL 4514277, at *9 n.15 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Nov.
9, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); Hiller v. Meritage Homes of Texas, LLC, No. 4:09-CV-4036,
2011 WL 1232065, at *4 n.5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011) (no conflict between Arizona and
Texas law concerning the ability to arbitrate an employment discrimination claim arising
from a contract designating Arizona law); Flagship Credit Corp. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co.,
No. H-10-3616, 2011 WL 1638638, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2011) (no conflict between
Pennsylvania and Texas law on the insurability of punitive damages in regard to a related
Pennsylvania lawsuit) rev'd in part & vacated in part, No. 11-20408, 2012 WL 2299484 (5th
Cir. June 15, 2012) (per curiam); Regions Equip. Fin. Corp. v. AT 2400, Official No.
530775, 640 F.3d 124, 127-28 (5th Cir. 2011) (no conflict between Alabama and federal
maritime law on the issue of promissory notes' "entire agreement" clause disallowing side
agreements).
201. Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Ins. Co. v. MIV Sophie Rickmers explains the re-
quirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 for pleading and proving Japanese
law in a maritime cargo loss case in the Pacific Ocean. Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Ins.
Co. v. MJV Sophie Rickmers, No. H-09-886, 2011 WL 2970821, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 21,
2011).
202. The Survey period produced one example-but it is unusual because it involved
the forum's use of another state's procedural law. Tau Kappa Epsilon v. USA Bus Charter,
Inc. is an action by University of Texas students against an Arizona bus charterer over
transportation problems traveling to the Texas-OU game in Dallas in 2008. Tau Kappa
Epsilon v. USA Bus Charter, Inc., No. 03-10-00768-CV, 2011 WL 3250598, at *3 (Tex.
App.-Austin July 28, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.). When plaintiffs ignored the con-
tract's arbitration clause and sued in Texas, defendant's Arizona lawyer assumed Texas law
provided the same ten-day notice of entry of default as did Arizona law. Defendant's
lawyer was wrong and had to file a motion for new trial to set aside the default. The court
of appeals affirmed the Texas trial court's grant of a new trial, applying the Arizona default
notice rule in holding defendant's lawyer had made a good faith mistake of law in not
responding timely to the Texas suit. Id. (citing ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 55(a)).
203. Damian v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. was a wrongful death suit arising from a
helicopter crash in Panama. Damian v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 352 S.W.3d 124,
138-39 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied). The court applied the Texas wrongful
death statute's limitation rule, which calls for the shorter period of Texas law or the acci-
dent's situs. Nonetheless, the plaintiff's action prevailed because Panama's one-year pe-
riod was tolled under Panama law by the related criminal investigation into the accident.
Id. Cypress/Spanish Fort I, L.P. v. Professional Service Industries, Inc. was a business tort
action related to construction of a shopping center in Alabama. Cypress/Spanish Fort I,
L.P. v. Professional Service Industries, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 698, 704 (N.D. Tex 2011)The
court ignored the contract's choice of Alabama law and characterized the limitations issue
as procedural. Id. at 708-09. Invoking the rule that the forum applies its own procedure,
the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. The court rejected the application of
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws which applies the most significant relationship
test to limitations issues, noting that the Texas Supreme Court had yet to adopt it. Id. at
709. Daybreak Express, Inc. v. Lexington Insurance Co. applied the same rule that limita-
tions are procedural, and did so in an instance of a federal claim being litigated in state
court (applying a Texas limitation period to a federal claim because the federal law was
silent). Daybreak Express, Inc. v. Lexington Insurance Co., 342 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. filed)
204. Although this Survey article does not cover intra-jurisdictional venue transfers in
the Forum Contest section, four Survey period cases provided examples of choice of law
affecting the public factors discussion in forum transfers. See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Vitus
Marine, LLC, No. H-11-3022, 2011 WL 4972025, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2011) (Washing-
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compensation, 20 5 arbitration, 20 6 and renvoi.20 7
IV. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Foreign judgments from other states and countries create Texas con-
flict-of-laws issues in two ways: (1) their local enforcement and (2) their
preclusive effect on local lawsuits. The Survey period did not offer any
notable preclusion opinions, but there are several judgment-enforcement
cases worth mentioning.
Texas recognizes two methods of enforcing foreign judgments: the
common law method, using the foreign judgment as the basis for a local
lawsuit, 208 and, since 1981, the more direct procedure under the two uni-
form judgments acts.209 Section 36.007 of the Texas Civil Practice and
ton law likely to govern insurance coverage dispute regarding defective welds in barge
equipment); Sweet v. Indianapolis Jet Ctr., Inc., No. SA-10-CV-1039-XR, 2011 WL
2518862, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 22, 2011) (unclear whether Texas or Indiana law will gov-
ern, but Indiana federal court will have no trouble applying either); Blitz USA, Inc., v.
Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., No. 3:11-CV-0034-G, 2011 WL 1602718, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr.
27, 2011) (most likely that Oklahoma law will govern insurance dispute regarding failure to
defend on commercial general liability policy); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., No. 3:10-CV-1825-L, 2010 WL 5287538, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2010) (New York
law likely governs dispute regarding commercial mortgage-backed securities).
205. Johnson v. TDS Erectors, Inc. is a per curiam opinion upholding the trial court's
summary judgment for defendant, dismissing the wrongful death claim on the grounds it
was governed by Arkansas workers compensation law. Johnson v. TDS Erectors, Inc., 426
Fed. App'x. 241, 241 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 6, 145 (the general tort principle) & 184 (conflict rule for abolition of personal
injury or wrongful death claim by workers' compensation scheme) (1971) ).
206. Arbitration agreements can have important choice-of-law functions not only in the
choice of governing law, but also in the choice of arbitration rules. In re Qlshan Founda-
tion Repair Co., LLC involved several contracts with varying language in the arbitration
clauses. In re Olshan Foundation Repair Co., LLC, 328 S.W.3d 883, 889-90 (Tex. 2010).
The Texas Supreme Court held that the clauses in one set of foundation-repair contracts
failed to preclude the Federal Arbitration Act which preempted the possibility of the Texas
Arbitration Act's application, while the clause in another contract required the parties to
submit to binding arbitration under the Texas Act. Similar issues arose in other Texas
cases. See, e.g., BDO Seidman, LLP, v. J.A. Green Dev. Corp., 327 S.W.3d 852, 859 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.) (contract's arbitration clause designating New York law was
insufficient to preempt the Federal Arbitration Act); Denver City Energy Assocs., L.P., v.
Golden Spread Elec. Coop., Inc., 340 S.W.3d 538, 542 n.2 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2011, pet.
filed) (arbitration clause insufficiently specific to preempt the Federal Arbitration Act).
207. Renvoi is the practice of applying another state's entire law including its choice-of-
law rule. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8 (1971). In Garriott v.
NCsoft Corp. the district court had ruled that the parties' choice-of-law agreement re-
quired the application of Korean law, including its choice-of-law rule, which in turn
pointed to Texas law to govern the award of attorney fees. Garriott v. Ncsoft Corp., 661
F.3d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 2011). Defendant appealed instead, asserting Korean substantive
law should be applied to limit the attorney fee award. The Fifth Circuit declined to con-
duct a choice-of-law analysis, finding a false conflict between Korea and Texas law.
208. The underlying mandate for the common law enforcement is the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution and its statutory counterpart. U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006). The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
specifically reserves the common law method as an alternative. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 35.008 (West 2008).
209. Sister-state judgments are enforced under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act (UEFJA). TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-.003 (West
2008), 35.004 (West Supp. 2011), 35.005-.008 (West 2008). Foreign-country judgments for
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Remedies Code expressly reserves the right of enforcement of non-mone-
tary judgments under traditional, non-statutory standards,210 along with
similar acts for arbitration awards, 211 child custody,212 and child sup-
port.213 Federal judgments may be enforced in any other federal district
courts as local judgments,214 but may also be enforced as sister-state judg-
ments in Texas state courts.
Carter v. Cline shows the importance of both, proper filing and timely
objections, as well as the court's power to assess the foreign judgment
beyond its labeling.215 Carter, a Texas resident, contracted to buy a home
in Little Rock, Arkansas, from the Clines. When Carter later withdrew
from the deal, the Clines sued Carter in an Arkansas court, and Carter, in
turn, sued the realtors. The Clines won a jury verdict for $42,500, and
Carter won a verdict for $30,000 against the realtors. The Clines then
domesticated the Arkansas judgment in Harris County but failed to file a
certificate of authenticity as required by Texas law, although it was later
corrected. The Arkansas court then issued an attorney's fees order in the
Clines' favor for $86,266, which the Clines also domesticated in Texas.
Carter had notice of these domestications but never objected. Mean-
while, in Arkansas, the realtors were granted a new trial against Carter,
which raised doubts about the finality of the earlier orders. The Clines
severed their case in the Arkansas court and had a new judgment issued
that consolidated the damages and attorney's fees at $127,766.00, al-
though they never filed it in the Texas court.216
Carter did nothing to defend himself in Texas until the Clines garnished
his bank account. Carter then objected on several grounds, including the
apparent interlocutory nature of the Arkansas judgments, the Clines' fail-
ure to file the certificate of authenticity contemporaneously with the
judgment, and the failure to file the later severed judgment.21 7 The trial
court denied Carter's objections and the appellate court affirmed, holding
that the Arkansas orders satisfied the facial finality standard, and to the
extent the Clines did not follow proper filing procedures, Carter had
waived his objections by acquiescing at the domestication stage. 218
money are enforced under the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition
Act (UFCMJRA). TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.001-008 (West 2008).
210. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.008 (West 2008); see generally Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (comity as discretionary grounds for recognizing and
enforcing foreign-country judgments).
211. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006); Texas International Arbi-
tration Act, TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 172.082(f) (West 2011).
212. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.303 (West 2008).
213. Id. § 159.601.
214. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006).
215. Carter v. Cline, No. 03-10-00855-CV, 2011 WL 4924214 (Tex. App.-Austin Oct.
13, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op).
216. Id. at *1-3.
217. Carter objected that the Arkansas judgment was labeled "Jury Verdict Judgment,"
and because it did not express finality was merely an interlocutory judgment incapable of
enforcement under the UEFJA. Id. at *3.
218. Id. at *5-9.
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Counsel Financial Services, L.L.C. v. Leibowitz provides a second ex-
ample of proper defense techniques.219 Liebowitz is a Texas lawyer who
borrowed $5 million from Counsel, a New York lender. When Liebowitz
failed to pay, Counsel obtained a judgment in New York, which
Liebowitz unsuccessfully appealed. When Counsel domesticated the
New York judgment in Bexar County, Liebowitz was granted a motion
for new trial because the trial court refused enforcement. The San
Antonio Court of Appeals reversed and rendered judgment in Counsel's
favor.220
To collect, Counsel intervened in a personal injury lawsuit in Hidalgo
County, seeking to attach the attorney's fees of the victorious plaintiff's
lawyer, Liebowitz, who responded by asking the Hidalgo district court to
enjoin Counsel from pursuing collection efforts in Texas. Characterizing
Counsel's intervention as vexatious and harassing, the court granted the
injunction. 221 The appellate court reversed, ruling that the Hidalgo dis-
trict court lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the Bexar County district
court's domesticated judgment.222 Although this ruling mooted the rest
of the case, the court also noted that the vexatious-and-harassing stan-
dard for anti-suit injunctions required multiple litigation, not this single
intervention.223
In two other UEFJA cases, Texas courts of appeal accepted and re-
jected Oklahoma judgments in family law matters. In re Guardianship of
Parker was the ongoing litigation between a sister and brother competing
for guardian status for their mother.224 After a Texas court appointed the
sister, her brother obtained a contrary order from an Oklahoma court.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's rejection of the Oklahoma
order, holding that even though the Oklahoma order was properly filed
under the UEFJA, it did not have to be given effect because enforcement
measures do not travel with the sister-state judgment, guardianship or-
ders are subject to revision, and Texas has adopted specific measures for
foreign guardianship orders-which the petitioner had ignored.225
In re Marriage of Dalton involved a couple who separated in Oklahoma
in 2006 purely for the purpose of protecting the family's assets from the
husband's business setbacks. 226 In spite of the Oklahoma court's detailed
order, the couple continued to live together and moved to Texas in 2008.
But in December 2008, the husband filed for divorce. In response, the
wife wanted the Texas court to recognize the Oklahoma order.227 The
219. Counsel Fin. Servs., L.L.C. v. Leibowitz, No. 13-10-00200-CV, 2011 WL 2652158
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi July 1, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
220. Id. at *1-2.
221. Id. at *2-4.
222. Id. at *8.
223. Id. at *12-13.
224. In re Guardianship of Parker, 329 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2010, pet.
denied).
225. Id. at 100-103.
226. In re Marriage of Dalton, 348 S.W.3d 290 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2011, no pet.).
227. Id. at 292-93.
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trial court refused, but the court of appeals reversed and rendered, hold-
ing that it was a proper foreign judgment entitled to enforcement under
the UEFJA.228
The Survey period produced two considerations of foreign-country
judgments, one a money judgment enforcement and the other a child cus-
tody matter under the Hague Convention. In Diamond Offshore (Ber-
muda), Ltd. v. Haaksman a Texas court of appeals rejected enforcement
of a Dutch judgment that was obtained in violation of a forum-selection
clause. 229 When Diamond Offshore gave notice of ceasing operations in
the North Sea, offering jobs on other drilling sites to Quinn and McCart-
ney. Instead, Quinn and McCartney sued in the Netherlands in violation
of their employment contracts' exclusive Bermuda forum clause. They
successfully domesticated the Dutch judgment in Texas, and Diamond
Offshore appealed on the grounds that the judgment was obtained in vio-
lation of the employment contracts' exclusive Bermuda forum clause.230
The court of appeals reversed and held that the judgment was un-
recognizable under the Texas Uniform Foreign Country Money Judg-
ments Recognition Act ("UFCMJRA").2 31 A thorough dissent pointed
out that the court's grounds were discretionary under the UFCMJRA
and that because Diamond Offshore had not raised the forum clause is-
sue in the Netherlands, it should not be allowed in Texas. 232
Livanos v. Livanos provides a good discussion of the intricacies of in-
ternational custody enforcement, the interaction of the Hague Conven-
tion with domestic laws, and the need for strict adherence to procedural
steps.233 Livanos was a lengthy battle (as is the case in many interna-
tional custody cases) over the mother's illegal child-snatching of her
young son, involving courts in Greece, Maryland, and Texas. After the
mother did not appear at two hearings in Fort Bend County, the Texas
court issued a default order against her for the child's return to Greece
and $68,300 in attorney's fees.2 34 The court of appeals reversed because
the father had not proven strict compliance with the applicable notice
provisions. 235
V. CONCLUSION
Following the United States Supreme Court opinions 236 in July 2011,
many Texas courts needed to reassess their calculations of personal juris-
diction under the stream-of-commerce and general jurisdiction doctrines.
228. Id. at 294-98.
229. Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd. v. Haaksman, 355 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).
230. Id. at 844-45.
231. Id. at 847-49.
232. Id. at 856-57 (Frost, J., dissenting).
233. Livanos v. Livanos, 333 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
234. Id. at 870-73.
235. Id. at 874-81.
236. See supra notes 3-32 and accompanying text.
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Although the United States Supreme Court merely clarified existing law,
those clarifications compel a narrower standard than some Texas courts
now apply.
In other areas, the Survey period showed continued trends highlighted
by a diverse subject matter that finds new focuses from year to year. This
period included four legislative jurisdiction cases (some years have
none),237 six choice-of-law analyses applying the corporate affairs doc-
trine,238 three useful discussions of choice of law and jurisdiction in Multi-
District Litigation,239 and a noteworthy discussion of the law controlling
bankruptcy exemptions.240 Texas courts continued a cautionary approach
in finding personal jurisdiction based solely on internet contacts241 and in
providing a Texas forum for non-commercial tort claims connected in
part to other states.242
One aberration-we hope not a trend-is the number of Texas courts
accepting choice-of-law clauses without consideration of whether the cho-
sen law contradicts the public policy of a state with a stronger relationship
to the claim. 243 In spite of that one aberration, this Survey period's cases
continue to show an increased sophistication in applying the many as-
pects of Restatement analysis.
237. See supra notes 113-132 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 49-55, 83-86, 104 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
241. Texas courts approved internet jurisdiction in one case and rejected it in three
others.
242. The Survey period reported two cases based on torts and both were dismissed on
forum non conveniens grounds, with none of the cases in the long-arm section dealing with
non-commercial torts. The choice of law section shows similar results, with twenty-nine
cases dealing with interstate contract disputes and only three cases dealing with non-com-
mercial torts.
243. See supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text.
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